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T HREE YEARS AGO, the writer published an article in this Review
in opposition to relaxed abortion laws.' Since that time, permis-
sive legislation has been enacted in California, Colorado, North Caro-
lina, Maryland, 2 Georgia,3 and England.4 In March, 1968, the Gover-
nor's Commission to Review New York State's Abortion Law, of
which the writer was a member, recommended a radical relaxation
of the New York law,5 to which the writer dissented.6
Paradoxically, as the abortion movement has gained momentum
over the past three years, the reasons for opposing it have become
more valid and more urgent. A number of the myths, which formerly
underpinned the structure of "reform," have collapsed, and the status
of the fetus as a human child has emerged with convincing clarity.
The Legal Myth
One of the principal props of abortion reform is the myth that
the fetus has no status in law as a human child. The falsity of the
myth may be demonstrated conveniently by following the progress of
the decisions in New Jersey, a state which has developed a consider-
able body of law on the status and rights of the unborn child.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1Byrn, The Abortion Question: A Nonsectarian Approach, 11 CATHOLIC LAW.
316 (1965).
2 For a brief summary of the legislation in these four states, see 3 CR. L.
2135 (1968).
3 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1968, at 32, col. 8.
4See St. John-Stevas, Abortion-The English Experience, 117 AMERICA 707
(1967).
5 REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION APPOINTED TO REVIEW NEW YORK
STATE'S ABORTION LAW (March, 1968).
6 MINORITY REPORT OF ROBERT M. BYRN, ESQ., JOHN GRANT HARRISON, M.D.,
AND MONSIGNOR WILLIAM F. MCMANUS, MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COM-
MISSION APPOINTED TO REVIEW NEW YORK STATE'S ABORTION LAW (March,
1968). (Hereinafter referred to as the MINORITY REPORT).
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For many years, New Jersey clung to
the rule, first enunciated by Holmes in
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton7
that a child has no cause of action against
a third person to recover for damages
wrongfully inflicted upon it in the womb,
on the theory that when the injury was
inflicted, the fetus was a vegetating part
of the mother and not a separate indivi-
dual to whom legal duties were owed.8
In the 1946 case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,9
a Federal district court rejected the
Dietrich rule and permitted a recovery for
a pre-natal injury. Said the Bonbrest
court: "The law is presumed to keep pace
with the sciences and medical science
certainly has made progress since 1884,"
and, "From the viewpoint of the civil law
and the law of property, a child en ventre
sa mere is not only regarded as a human
being, but as such from the moment of
conception-which it is in fact." 10
The pre-natal injury cases decided im-
mediately after Bonbrest dealt almost
exclusively with injuries to viable children
(children in the womb who are capable
of existence apart from the mother). It
was left for the New York court in Kelly
v. Gregory" to bring the law completely
in line with modern science via its deci-
sion that as a matter of law, humanity
7 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
8 See Stemmer v. Kline, 123 N.J.L. 455, 26
A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
9 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
10id. at 143, 140.
11 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d
Dep't 1953).
is achieved at conception-long before
viability. As the unanimous court put
it:
We know something more of the actual
process of conception and foetal de-
velopment now than when some of the
common-law cases were decided.
The complaint here, in alleging that
plaintiff was in being in the third month
of his mother's pregnancy, alleges a
conclusion of fact consistent with gener-
ally accepted knowledge of the process. 12
The effects of Bonbrest and Kelly were
not felt in New Jersey until the 1960 case
of Smith v. Brennan1 ' when the supreme
court of that state held that a child
might recover for injuries which he had
suffered in the womb before he had
reached the stage of viability. The court
observed, "Medical authorities have long
recognized that a child is in existence
from the moment of conception," and,
"medical authorities recognize that before
birth an infant is a distinct entity, and
. .. the law recognizes that rights which
he will enjoy when born can be violated
before his birth." 14
12id. at 543-44, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
1331 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
14 Id. at 362, 157 A.2d at 502. For cases
in other jurisdictions, see Byrne. The Legal
Rights of the Unborn, 41 L.A.B. BULL.
24 (1965). More recent cases include Tori-
gian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446,
225 N.E.2d 926 (1967), and Sylvia v. Gobeille,
220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966). In the Sylvia case,
it was held that a cause of action exists in
favor of a child against a doctor upon an
allegation that the child was born with certain
physical defects by reason of the doctor's
negligent failure to prescribe gamma globulin
for her mother during pregnancy, notwith-
In 1964, in the case of Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. An-
derson,1 5 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey was asked to decide whether the
rights of a child in utero were violated
by his mother's refusal, on religious
grounds, to submit to a blood transfusion
deemed necessary to preserve the lives
of both the mother and the child. Citing
Smith, the court quite logically found a
parity of rights between the unborn and
afterborn child; decided that the unborn
child is entitled to the law's protection,
and ordered the mother to submit to the
transfusion:
In State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,
181 A.2d 751 (1962), we held that the
State's concern for the welfare of an
infant justified blood transfusions not-
withstanding the objection of its parents
who were also Jehovah's Witnesses, and
in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157
A.2d 497 (1960), we held that a child
could sue for injuries negligently inflicted
upon it prior to birth. We are satisfied
that the unborn child is entitled to the
law's protection and that an appropriate
order should be made to insure blood
transfusions to the mother in the event
that they are necessary in the opinion
of the physician in charge at the time."6
standing his knowledge of the mother's ex-
posure to German measles. The Sylvia case
spotlights, in particular, the legal untenability
of eugenic abortion. The Rhode Island court
quite properly held that the human child in
utero has a right to good medical care when
exposed to the dangers of German measles.
The abortion advocates would permit the use
of German measles as a eugenic justification
for the destruction of the child.
15 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964).
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The unborn child's right to life prevailed
even over his mother's right freely to
practice her religion.
In 1967, the inevitable occurred and
the New Jersey Supreme Court was
called upon to apply the principle of
Smith and Raleigh Fitkin to a litigation
which involved the unborn child's right
not to be aborted. Gleitman v. Cos-
grove l' was an action for money dam-
ages brought by a husband and wife
on behalf of themselves and their child,
Jeffrey, against two doctors upon an alle-
gation that Jeffrey had been born with
grave defects after the defendants had
negligently failed to warn the Gleitmans
that the attack of German measles, which
Mrs. Gleitman had suffered during preg-
nancy, might result in such defects. The
failure to give the warning, it was al-
leged, deprived the parties of an oppor-
tunity to terminate the pregnancy. In
affirming the dismissal of the complaint,
the majority of the court emphasized the
unborn child's right to life:
The right to life is inalienable in our
society .... We are not faced here with
the necessity of balancing the mother's
life against that of her child. The sanc-
16 Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538 (emphasis
added). This decision points up the fallacy
of the argument made by some abortion ad-
vocates that Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), renders anti-abortion laws uncon-
stitutional. The right of privacy, expounded in
Griswold in connection with the conjugal use
of contraceptives, has no application to an act,
either covert or overt which destroys a human
being who "is entitled to the law's protection."
Contraception prevents human life from coming
into being; abortion destroys a human life
in being.
1T 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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tity of the single human life is the deci-
sive factor in this suit in tort. . . . It
may have been easier for the mother and
less expensive for the father to have ter-
minated the life of their child while he
was an embryo, but these alleged detri-
ments cannot stand against the precious-
ness of the single human life to support
a remedy in tort.18
The unborn child's right to life prevailed
even over his parents' right not to endure
emotional and financial hardship.
I have urged elsewhere that permissive
abortion laws deprive the unborn child
of the equal protection of the law in
contravention of the Fourteenth Amend-
'S Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693. A recent,
unpublished determination by the California
Supreme Court is currently being cited, in
opposition to Gleitman v. Cosgrove, for the
proposition that the unborn child has no legally
recognized rights. In O'Beirne v. Kaiser
Memorial Hospital (Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner, Dec. 8, 1967, at A-20, col. 1), the
California court denied a husband's petition
to restrain his wife from obtaining an abortion.
After reviewing accounts of the superior court
decision by Judge George H. Barnett and of
the supreme court decision, Professor Charles
E. Rice has concluded that, "Presiding Judge
Barnett considered the case to involve an
abortion required to save the life of the
mother. He never squarely decided the issue
of whether abortion should be allowed if not
necessary to save the life of the mother.
Therefore, neither his decision nor the peremp-
tory decision without opinion by the California
State Supreme Court disturbs the proposition
that the unborn child has a constitutional right
to be born where an abortion is not required
to save the life of his mother." Testimony of
Prof. Charles E. Rice before the Governor's
Commission Appointed to Review New York
State's Abortion Law, quoted in MiNorrY
REPORT 38-39.
ment of the United States Constitution. 9
That argument is especially demonstrable
in the context of the New Jersey cases.
For the fetus is at all times to be regarded
as a human child, 20 possessed of a right
to life which is not only sacred and in-
alienable, 21 but also superior to his pa-
rents' rights to practice their religion and
to be free of emotional and financial
hardship. 22 In other words, he has a
right to the law's protection on a par with
that of his post-natal brother.2
Recently, the Supreme Court of the
United States defined the characteristics
of the "person" to whom the fourteenth
amendment guarantees equal protection
of the law:
We start from the premise that illegit-
imate children are not "nonpersons."
They are humans, live and have their
being. They are clearly "persons" with-
in the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
Unborn children too are "humans, live
and have their being." Thus, they are
" 'persons' within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and no public opinion poll,
no popular vote, reflecting the currents of
the moment rather than the mainstream
of thought, can overcome this constitu-
tional hurdle.
The Statistical Myth
Another of the discredited myths of
the abortion movement is the assertion
that there are 1,000,000 illegal abortions
1'5 Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQUESNE
L. REv. 125, 134-35 (1966-67).
20 See text supra, at note 14.
21 See text supra, at note 18.
22 See text supra, at notes 16 and 18.
23 See text supra, at note 16.
24 Levy v. Louisiana, 390 U.S. - (1968).
annually in the United States, and these
may result in as many as 10,000 maternal
deaths. The 1,000,000 figure is an extrap-
olation of several unrepresentative sur-
veys. Actually, recent demographic cri-
tiques by Dr. Andre Hellegers,2 5 formerly
Associate Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology and Lecturer in Population
Dynamics at the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, Norbert J. Mietus, Esq.,26 a Cali-
fornia attorney and Professor at Sacra-
mento State College, and Dr. Herbert
Ratner, Director of Public Health at
Oak Park, Illinois,'2  have discredited
these surveys as reliable indicators of the
incidence of abortion. Indeed, Dr. Hel-
legers wrote of one of the surveys (which
was based upon case histories of women
who attended the Margaret Sanger Birth
Control Clinic in New York City between
1925 and 1929), "I doubt that any first
year student in an epidemiology course
would pass if he attempted to draw con-
clusions about the United States from
such a sample."' 2 Dr. Hellegers went
on to point out that projections from
two other less publicized, but no less
reliable studies would yield a figure of
illegal abortions of between 100,000 and
200,000 annually.
Even this statistic has been challenged,
for, using the 100,000 figure, we arrive
at a ratio of abortions to live births in
the United States of about 1 to 35. Yet
25Hellegers, Abortion, the Law, and the Com-
mon Good, MEDICAL OPINION & REVIEW 76
(May, 1967).
26N. MIETUs, THE THERAPEUTIC ABORTION
ACT 2-11 (1967).
27Ratner, A Public Health Physician Views
Abortion, 7 CHILD AND FAMILY 38 (1968).
s Hellegers, supra note 25, at 85.
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as Dr. Ratner has pointed out, "In
Sweden, where abortion is legalized and
where abortion has become a cultural
pattern, the rate of abortion to live
births in 1963 was only 1 to 31. . ," 29
On the other hand, Prof. John T. Noonan
of the University of California Law
School was able to project a maximum
of between 40,000 and 50,000 illegal
abortions annually in the United States by
basing his computations on a parallel
study done in England.30
Demographers are even more out-
spoken regarding the allegation of 10,000
maternal deaths. Dr. Christopher Tietze,
a firm proponent of permissive abortion,
has denounced the figure as "unmitigated
nonsense" and has estimated the total
at closer to 500, based upon known
mortality figures.31
One begins to see how foolish it is to
accept out-of-hand these figures on illegal
abortion. One begins to suspect also
that in at least a few instances the figures
are repeated more for their demoralizing
effect than for their accuracy.
Actually, one wonders why these figures
are cited at all. Generally, the bills that
have been introduced in state legislatures
would legalize abortion in case of a prog-
nosis of a substantial threat to the mental
or physical health of the mother or the
unborn child, or in the instance of a
2. Ratner, supra note 27, at 40.
30Statement (unpublished) of Prof. John T.
Noonan, delivered at a hearing conducted
jointly by the Assembly Committees on Codes
and Health of the New York State Legisla-
ture, Feb. 10, 1967.
31 Quoted in N.Y. Post, Sept. 7, 1967, at 31,
col. 1.
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pregnancy resulting from rape or incest.
Yet, there is general agreement that
enactment of the proposed legislation
would not significantly reduce the num-
ber of illegal abortions-simply because
the vast bulk of abortions are performed
for reasons other than those provided in
the proposals, i.e., reasons of socio-eco-
nomic convenience. In fact, the most
optimistic prediction I have seen is a
reduction of 32,000 from the spurious
figure of 1,000,000.32
The Theological Myth
The abortion movement has found it
expedient to isolate the Catholic Church
as the only opponent of permissive abor-
tion. This tactic has facilitated the
movement's claim that the Church is at-
tempting to impose its own theology on
a pluralistic society. Thus the abortion
advocates have gained ground by capital-
izing on religious divisiveness.
As the abortion debate becomes more
profound, the myth of sectarian domina-
tion is gradually being dispelled. For
instance, the International Conference on
Abortion, held at Washington, D.C. in
September, 1967, revealed that abortion
is not the concern only of the theologians
of a single sect. Rather it is an inter-
disciplinary problem which transcends
denominational loyalties and touches life
itself.A3  Actually, a significant body of
non-Catholic ethical thought in opposition
2 Dr. Edmund W. Overstreet, quoted in N.Y.
Times, Apr. 13, 1967, at 15, col. 1 (predict-
ing a total of 40,000 legal abortions, an in-
crease of 32,000 over the current rate of
aproximately 8,000 a year).
3X The proceedings of the Conference are di-
gested in THE TERRIBLE CHOICE: THE ABORTION
DILEMMA (paperback ed. 1968).
to abortion has surfaced in the last sev-
eral years.3 4  In addition, the opponents
of permissive abortion have themselves
had occasion to eschew sectarian theol-
ogy in favor of a broader pluralistic
approach. As an example, the minority
of the Governor's Commission to Review
New York State's Abortion Law rejected
the ancient theory of delayed animation
as a relevant test of the humanity of the
unborn child:
Theological speculations on when the
soul enters the body have their place.
But . . . the benefit of the doubt is with
the human child in utero. In a plural-
istic society, theorizing about whether
ensoulment occurs and human life begins
in utero when this part of the body or
that becomes organized or connected is
unacceptable as a measure of human
rights. At hearings conducted on the
'Blumenthal' abortion bill during the
1967 session of the legislature, Professor
John T. Noonan, Jr. of the University
of California Law School (Berkeley) told
an Assembly Committee, 'I myself know
of only one test for humanity: A being
who was conceived of human parents and
is potentially capable of human acts is
human. By what other test could you
prove that an infant of one day was
human? . . . We know he is a man be-
cause he came of human flesh and is
expected at some point to perform a
human act, to think a human thought.
Can we say less of the human embryo?' 3
Certainly, it would be presumptuous
for the adherents of any particular reli-
gion to claim that they are the only
3 See, e.g., Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abor-
tion in ABORTION AND THE LAW 124 (Smith
ed. 1967); Drinan, Abortion-Contemporary
Protestant Thinking, 117 AMERICA 713 (1967).
35 MINORITY REPORT 26.
persons concerned for the well-being and
the rights of the unborn. It is even more
presumptuous for the abortion advocates
to make the claim for them.
The Clinical Myth
It is customary for the abortion ad-
vocates to depict an induced abortion in
clean, antisceptic and clinical terms. One
receives the impression of sterile, blood-
less surgery involving no more than the
excision of a minute blob of tissue. In
fact, the "D. & C." is a traumatic proce-
dure. The cervix is dilated and the
fetus is removed with a rake-like instru-
ment called a curette. According to Dr.
Alan Guttmacher, "in pregnancies beyond
the seventh week, fetal parts are recog-
nizable as they are removed piecemeal." 30
At a Planned Parenthood Federation con-
ference on abortion in 1955, induced
abortion was referred to as a "mutilating
operation." 3
Mrs. Jill Knight, a Member of Parlia-
ment and a leader of the opposition to
the English abortion bill has described
the procedure in this way:
Earlier in this speech, gentlemen, I
used the phrase 'killing a baby' to de-
scribe an abortion . . . for at the
stage when abortions are normally car-
ried out, the baby is perfectly formed,
with all its limbs quite recognizable.
Having been evacuated, it must fre-
quently be destroyed or left to die by
36 Guttmacher, Techniques of Therapeutic
Abortion, 7 CLINICAL OB. & GYN. 100, 103
(1964).
87 Colloquy between Dr. Iago Galdston and
Dr. Alan Guttmacher in ABORTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 163 (Calderone ed. 1958).
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the theatre staff. This is one of the
reasons why most doctors and nurses
hate abortions. If the 'it's only a blob'
brigade saw a tiny aborted child, they
would perhaps lose a little of their
poise.A8
It is little wonder that Dr. Herbert
Ratner has condemned induced abortion
as "the intrauterine battered child syn-
drome which we are so opposed to and
feel is so cruel when it is extrauterine. 39
The Socio-Familial Myth
Perhaps the greatest myth of all is the
one which commends abortion, qua a
technique of birth control, as a benefit to
family and society. Quite the contrary,
permissive abortion seems to go hand-in-
hand with the erosion of family values.
Dr. Alan Guttmacher has found a connec-
tion between the loosening of family struc-
ture and the prevalence of abortion in
pre-Christian Rome:
Previous to the conclusion of the second
war against Carthage (218-201 B.C.),
Rome was an austere and moralistic na-
tion, but after the war its moral fiber
weakened. . . . It was at this time that
various religious cults arose to legitima-
tize sexual vices. At this time, with the
loosening of the family structure and
decline of the power of the paterfamilias,
abortion flourished. 40
Dr. C. P. Harrison points to a develop-
ing cynicism toward family values in
abortion-ridden Eastern Europe 4 1 and a
s Quoted in MINORITY REPORT 5-6.
39 Quoted in Id., at 20.
40 Guttmacher, The Legal and Moral Status of
Therapeutic Abortion, 4 PROGRESS IN GYNE-
COLOGY 279, 280-81 (1963).
41Harrison, On the Futility of Legalizing
Abortion, 95 CAN. MED. J. 360, 362 (1966).
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similar phenomenon has been observed
in Japan where "[t]he easy availability
of abortion is said to have undermined
relationships between parents and chil-
dren. . . . The Chief of the Children's
Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of
Welfare has stated that children raised in
an 'abortion age'. feel a lack of parental
love, and as a result, turn to anti-social
behavior and juvenile crime." 42 Dr.
Robert E. Hemphill expressed concern
over the effects of abortion on the family
in an article in The Lancet:
It is impossible to estimate the effect on
the mind of a young girl who learns that
her mother has been to the hospital and
had a baby 'taken away.' To know
that such events are not uncommon must
be harmful to her character development
and to relations within the family. 43
These warnings of parent-child alien-
ation and family breakdown have special
significance in view of modern American
techniques of sex education. The widely
hailed book, Modern Sex Education, in-
structs the young reader that, "Human
life begins when the head of the sperm
cell, which carries the nucleus, unites
with the nucleus of the ovum or egg
cell. This is called fertilization ....
Fertilization of the egg cell is also re-
ferred to as conception. In other words,
it is at this time that a new life is con-
ceived." 44 The child cannot fail to know
that an abortion destroys a human life.
Human life is at the heart of the abor-
tion debate. As Lutheran Pastor Richard
John Neuhaus has written, "How flexible
42SHAW, ABORTION ON TRIAL 131 (1968).
43Hemphill, The Abortion Bill, THE LANCET,
Feb. 11, 1967, at 324, 325.
44 JULIAN & JACKSON, MODERN SEX EDUCATION
27-28 (1967).
can we be with regard to abortion is
tantamount, I believe, to asking how
flexible we can be with regard to taking
human life." 45
Pastor Neuhaus is correct. Until the
present time, we have tolerated abortion
as a last resort procedure for preserving
human life. We are now asked to sanc-
tion the procedure as a desirable means
of preserving human happiness by de-
stroying human life. Dr. Harrison put
it this way:
If the terms under which abortion is to
be legally permitted are not to be con-
cerned solely with those conditions which
constitute an immediate threat to the
mother's life, then the legal indications
change subtly from the preservation of
life to the preservation of happiness and
who can best determine what can make
her happy but the patient? In other
words, if one woman is pregnant and has
kidney disease and another is pregnant
as a result of some extramarital mis-
adventure, there would be no justification
in terms of public benefit for the law
to permit the one to preserve her health
by abortion and forbid the other to pre-
serve her marriage by the same means. 46
In short, we must ask ourselves: Are
we flexible enough with regard to taking
human life to alter the thrust of the
law from the preservation of a life that
is precious to the destruction of a life
that is burdensome?
It is futile to deny the humanity of
the life destroyed by an abortion. In
almost every area of the law, we recog-
nize that a child is in existence from the
4,Neuhaus, The Dangerous Assumptions, 86
COMMONWEAL 408, 412 (1967).
46Harrison, supra note 41, at 361.
moment of conception.41 This, indeed,
is true in almost every area of life. As
Pastor Neuhaus wrote:
It is . . . profoundly disturbing to hear
many proponents of abortion reform
dismiss the question of life in a cavalier
manner. Pre-natal life is denigrated as
a 'piece of tissue,' 'a woman's mistake,'
or 'vegetating unborn matter.' Such
language begs the question in a disgrace-
ful manner. Biology and every day life
teach us that life is to be understood
in continuity with life. As one biologist
states it, 'Birth is but a convenient land-
mark in a continuous process.' Modern
medicine is beginning to refine the spe-
cialty of fetology, in which it is assumed
that the physicians' oath to preserve life
and to heal is fully applicable. The
casual claim that 'of course' and 'ob-
viously' there is a difference between
the fetus and the baby are supported only
by the wish for a simple resolution of a
troubling problem. 48
It is hard to see how the enactment
of permissive legislation will not result in
an unfortunate devaluation of human life.
A pregnant woman who buys a book on
what-to-do-until-the-baby-comes reads in
one that with the union of sperm and
ovum, "a new human being is created," 4
and in another that the unborn child "is
a living striving human being from the
very beginning." 5 Perhaps too, she has
been reading in the popular press of the
new science of fetology. "The birth of
a human really occurs at the moment
the mother's egg cell is fertilized by one
47 See text, supra at notes 9-23, and see Byrne,
supra note 14.
48 Neuhaus, supra note 45, at 410.
41, EASTMAN, EXPECTANT MOTHERHOOD 23 (3d
ed. 1957).
'(°MONTAGU, LIFE BEPORE BIRTH 2 (1964.
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of the father's sperm cells." , "The
perinatal period can be considered the
first year of life-the period from con-
ception through the nine months of preg-
nancy to the end of the first three months
of infancy." 52 "The coming together
of egg and sperm to make a new human
being is a small miracle." 53 "The fetus
is an 'unborn human astronaut'; capable
of free-floating movement and able to
exercise its arms and legs, react to sound,
eat and feel pain. . . . Both physicians
and mothers are coming to regard the
fetus not as a vegetable but as a vital
living individual." 54
Later, when she decides to abort-per-
haps because of a prognosis that the
child will be born defective-will the
woman really be able to black out the
memory of what she has read? And
what of her husband who picks up a
newspaper and on the same page with a
report of the progress of abortion bills
in various state legislatures, reads that
"The Massachusetts Supreme Court says
an unborn baby is 'a person' in the eyes
of the law and thus has a right to recover
damages for wrongful injury." 55
No doubt, we shall be able to sustain
the doublethink for awhile-the child we
want is a baby; the one we do not want
is fetal tissue-but there will come a time
when the fiction is discarded, when we
learn to accept, uneasily at first and then
with a certain equanimity, the pre-natal
51 The Droma of Life Before Birth, LIFE,
Apr. 30, 1965, at 54 (with illustrations).
52 NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1965, at 36.
53Conniff, The New Medical Specialty, Fet-
ology-The World of the Unborn, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 41.
54 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1968, at 94.
55 N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1967, at 14, col. 3.
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destruction of a human being for reasons
of personal happiness and social utility.
This is not the better part of wisdom.
Pastor Neuhaus said it well:
Our century has witnessed the demonic
consequences of man's distorted defini-
tions of himself along racist, nationalistic
and utilitarian lines. Nothing can be
taken for granted in terms of society's
understanding of human rights. In our
valuation of human life to be civilized is
to be conservative. 56
In our jurisprudence all men are en-
dowed with certain inalienable rights but
according to abortion proponent, Ashley
Montagu, "the embryo, fetus and new-
born of the human species, in point
of fact, do not really become functionally
human until humanized in the human
socialization process. Humanity is an
achievement not an endowment. . . . I
consider it a crime against humanity to
bring a child into the world whose ful-
fillment as a healthy human being is in
any way menaced or who itself menaces
the life of the mother or the quality of
the society into which it is born."
' ' 7
Here, after all is said and done, is the
jurisprudence of abortion reform. Is it
a boon to family and society? Or did
it prove to be a curse in an unhappy
experiment in Germany only a genera-
tion ago?
Conclusion
The ultimate issue in the debate is
whether abortion shall become an ac-
ceptable means of solving socioeconomic
5G Neuhaus, supra note 45, at 410.
.5 Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9,
1967, at 38, col. 5 (emphasis added).
problems.5" Twenty-five years ago, a
United States court provided the answer:
Arguments that abortion should be per-
mitted to avoid social disgrace or poverty
or illegitimacy have frequently been
made. . . . The performance of an
abortion for any of these purposes is so
offensive to our moral conception that
it does not seem unjust to put on the
defendant who has committed an abor-
tion the burden of producing evidence
that the act was justified on therapeutic
grounds.?'
Let us not underestimate the social
pressures which lead some women to pre-
fer abortion to childbirth. But abortion
need not, and must not become the ac-
cepted solution to any of our social
problems. We do have such alternatives
as assistance programs for the socially
and economically deprived and for the
distressed family of the physically and
mentally disadvantaged child. Perhaps,
after all, abortion is a symptom of deeper
social ills, and perhaps, it is toward the
uncovering and curing of these ills that
we ought to divert all the money, time
and energy that we have been expending
on promoting and opposing abortion.
58That there no longer exist any medical
grounds for abortion, see, e.g., Donnelly, Are
There Medical Indications for Abortion?, 52
J. MED. SOC. OF N.J. 112 (1955); Neffernan
& Lynch, Is Therapeutic Abortion Scientifically
Justified?, 19 LINACRE Q. 11 (1952). I have
explored "therapeutic abortion" as social engin-
eering in the articles cited supra at notes 1
and 19, and in The Anatomy of Abortion Re-
form, REPORT, August, 1966, at 21; Abortion-
The Future In America, 117 AMERICA 710
(1967).
5'Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81,
83 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
